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Abstract :  
 
Undeclared work is a popular academic and governmental research topic in most developed countries. 
In 2007, the European Commission decided to carry out a European Survey called “Eurobarometer” 
on  this  sensitive  issue.  The  Commission  interviewed  almost  27 000  citizens  coming  from  the  27 
European Union Member States. In this paper, we have relied on the undeclared work and tax evasion 
literature to identify 7 testing hypothesis that we test by a probit regression analysis corrected of the 




Throughout the world, the development of the shadow economy is a pervasive phenomenon, 
which, to date, are aroused the interest of many scholars. The development of the shadow 
economy  indeed  raises  a  range  of  issues  pertaining  to  a  large  range  of  disciplines,  from 
economics to sociology, political sciences, criminal law, etc.  
 
This being said, most scholars have to date encountered difficulties in formulating an accurate 
definition of the concept of “shadow economy”. This, in turn, is because the shadow economy 
covers a plethora of activities which are uneasy to observe: they may be either “underground” 
activities  (undertaken  by  private  persons  for  their  own  personal  use),  illegal  activities,  or 
simply activities which are missed because of deficiencies in the data collection program.
1  
 
In  an  attempt  to  surmount  this  methodological  flaw,  the  present  paper  focuses  a  specific 
aspect of the “shadow economy”, i.e. the legal economic activities which are hidden to the 
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1 See FEIGE and OTT (1999).   3 
State. More specifically, this paper focuses on undeclared work,
2 i.e. work that are lawful as 
regards to their nature, but which is not subject to the payment of taxes (income taxes, value 
added taxes, social security contributions, etc.) and to legal work standards (minimum wages, 
legal weekly working hours, etc.).  
 
The  purpose  of  the  present  paper  is  to  offer  a  formal  analysis  of  the  development  of 
undeclared work in the European Union (“EU”). The development of undeclared work is 
indeed a primary cause of concern for most European Member States. Undeclared work costs 
a considerable amount to the Member States’ budgets (less revenue in form of tax income and 
social security contributions), with loss estimates ranging between 7 and 16 per cent of GDP 
in Western Europe.
3 In addition, undeclared work is also a major social issue since undeclared 
workers  are  neither  covered  by  social  protection,  nor  protected  by  labour  law  standards. 
Finally, since 2003, the fight against undeclared work ranks amongst the top 10 priority list of 
the ambitious Lisbon agenda. However, whilst the deadline is coming fast, many European 
countries are still far from the objectives specified by the Lisbon Strategy.
4  
 
This paper follows the publication, in 2007, of the Eurobarometer, which is the result of an 
unprecedented survey (the “Eurobarometer Survey”) on undeclared work. In this survey, the 
European Commission interviewed 26.755 EU citizens aged 15 and over living in the 27 EU 
Member States.
5 In the majority of countries, this was the first time that a direct method of 
this kind was tested, making this survey a pilot study. The Eurobarometer database is thus a 
useful instrument. It can certainly improve the understanding and the causes of undeclared 
work.
6 Indeed, quantitative interviews have been conducted where the focus has been on the 
demand and supply of undeclared work. The interviewees have been asked how they view 
others’ frauds and, where applicable, fraud that they themselves have engaged into. They have 
                                                 
2 Productive activities that are lawful as regards to their nature, but are not declared to the public authorities. 
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activities.   4 
also been asked how  extensive they believed fraud to be, as  well as the motives leading 
people to commit fraud. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is not to provide yet another estimate of the level of the 
undeclared work.
7 Rather, it seeks to ascertain, on the basis of the Eurobaremeter survey, the 
structure and key explanatory factors for the development of undeclared work in Europe. To 
this end, we apply an econometric analysis corrected of sample selection bias, as usual with 
this kind of survey.  
 
The present paper is divided in three sections. First, it discusses the theory of undeclared work 
and introduces some well-know concepts in economic and social literature (I). Second, it 
describes our research design and explains our methodology (II). Third, a descriptive analysis 
is provided and finally, we report our results with explanations in the last section (III). The 
conclusion summarizes up our results and tries to identify tentative policy implications. 
 
I.  WHAT ARE THE KEY EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR 
UNDECLARED WORK IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ? 
 
The  theory  of  tax  evasion  exhibits  a  significant  number  of  analogies  with  the  theory  of 
undeclared work, and may thus help formulate various assumptions over the determinants of 
undeclared work.  
 
The large fiscal and social fraud’s scientific literature indicates that several attributes may 
explain why people in some countries cheat on paying taxes. Sandmo (2004, pp.31) made a 
relevant overview of tax evasion, which may be put in perspective with undeclared work. 
According to him, the decision to evade taxes results from an individual utility maximisation 
calculation. Individuals have to decide if they declare their whole income. If they do not, they 
can be detected and prosecuted. In this model, the whole income is exogenously given and the 
declared  income  is  the  decision  variable.  Individuals  maximise  their  utility  function  by 
choosing the optimal taxable income. Sandmo’s conclusion is relatively intuitive since the 
                                                 
7 Many studies study level of undeclared work. See RENOY, IVARSSON, VAN DER WUSTEN-GRITSAI and 
MEIJER (2007; pp.250–256) ; SCHNEIDER, ENSTE (1999, pp.71) ; SCHNEIDER, ENSTE (2002, pp.236) ; 
SCHNEIDER (2004, pp.64).   5 
higher the risk of being detected and the greater the punishment is, the higher the taxable part 
of  income  will  be.  In  brief,  this  model  suggests a  correlation  between,  on  the  one  hand, 
punishment or detection rate and, on the other hand declared income. 
 
Besides  Sandmo’s  general  theory  of  tax  evasion,  many  other  studies  have  shown  that  a 
number of personal characteristics and/or psychological and sociological factors may explain 
the decision not to report activities to state. For instance, a study of Jackson and Milliron 
identifies age, gender, education, income level, marginal tax rates, fairness, complexity and 
social ethics (or tax morale) as key explanatory factors for undeclared work and tax evasion.
8 
  
This literature provides a number of hypothesis that will later be tested with our database. 
First, older taxpayers are often more compliant than younger taxpayers (H1). The later are 
seemingly less risk averse than the former.
9  
 
Second, women would generally more compliant than men (H2).
10  
 
Third, the degree of education is also relevant. Individuals with a certain degree of education 
are assumed to better understand the utility of taxation than others, and thus are more prone to 
report their entire income to the tax administration.
11 This observation involves a negative 
correlation between the educational level and tax evasion for an individual (H3).
12  
 
Fourth,  the  social  ethics  (or  tax  morale)  is  another  important  determinant.  This  concept 
describes the moral principles or values individuals hold about paying taxes.
13 The literature 
shows that the social ethics and tax evasion are negatively correlated.
14 We suppose the same 
correlation for undeclared work. Indeed, social ethics could be defined as the general and 
personal willingness to act some undeclared activities. We will later discuss more about it in 
the  research  design  of  our  analysis.  For  the  time  being,  however,  we  assume  a  negative 
correlation between social ethics and undeclared work (H4). 
                                                 
8 See JACKSON and MILLIRON (1986, pp.125-165). 
9 See FEINSTEIN (1991, pp.14-35). 
10 See R. JACKSON and C. MILLIRON (1986, pp. 131). 
11 A study of LAMNEK et Al. in Germany shows another result: school education has no influence on the supply 
of undeclared work; See SCNEIDER, ENSTE, op. cit. (pp.82-83). 
12 See RICHARDSON (2006, pp.150-169). 
13  See  TORGLER  and  MURPHY  (pp.298-335).  In  this  paper,  tax  morale  is  the  independent  variable.  The 
authors try to identify factors that have an impact on tax morale. 
14 See RIAHI-BELKAOIU (2004, pp. 135–143).   6 
Fifth, the deterrence effect is one of the tax evasion’s determinants which is most studied in 
the  economics  and  psychology  literature.
15  This  effect  depends  on  the  chance  of  getting 
caught and penalized (detection probability) and the penalty’s size for evasion.
16 Therefore, 
deterrence effect should decrease tax evasion, or in others words, more detection probability 
is close to 1 and/or more penalty is high, less tax evasion occurs. This assumption is the same 
for the undeclared activities. People will work more without reporting their income to the 
government if the hazard to be caught is weak and/or if the penalty incurred is low (H5). 
 
Sixth,  regarding  the  territorial  spread,  it’s  common  knowledge  that  some  countries  are 
renowned for cheating more than others (H6). South European countries as Italy, Greece, 
Spain  or  Portugal  are  often  alleged  to  be  more  affected  by  the  phenomenon  than  Nordic 
countries  as  Germany,  Denmark,  Sweden,  etc.
17  This  is  why,  South  European  countries 
implement  more  correctness  for  the  undeclared  income  in  their  national  accounting  than 
Nordic ones. 
 
Finally, our last hypothesis concerns the cooperation of the interviewees. When interviewees 
cooperate hardly or simply do not cooperate, it can be assumed that they distrust the survey’s 
anonymity  because  they  are  probably  involved.  So  cooperation  should  be  negatively 










                                                 
15 See FREY (2003, pp.385-406); FREY and FELD (2002) ; G. YANIV (1999, pp. 27) ; F. COWELL (1985, 
pp.163-193). 
16 ALLINGHAM and SANDMO (1972) first formulated the deterrence model. In this model, tax payers have to 
ask themselves whether and how much to evade taxes. To do so, they apply the same approach as they would 
take any risky decision (by maximizing expected utility, taking into account penalties, probability to be discover 
and any other cost). 
17 See SCHNEIDER (2005, pp.20-21).   7 
II.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
II.1   Sample 
 
Our database relies on a survey and is thus necessarily fraught with methodological flaws. 
Tax evasion or undeclared work are indeed sensitive subjects since questioning an individual 
on tax evasion requires the disclosure of personal, and potentially incriminating, information. 
Thus,  self-reports  are  vulnerable  to  substantial  underreporting,  or  even,  no  reporting.
18 
However, the Eurobarometer provides the required information to understand what kind of 
individual is more likely to cheat the tax authorities.  
The sample covers the 27 European Union member’s states. Each data had been created by an 
interview, conducted in a face-to-face way. The number of interviews carried out is between 
500 and 1500 per country.  
 
 
II.2   Descriptive analysis of the data 
 
The  Eurobarometer  survey  seeks  information  over  individuals’  undeclared  activities. 
Individuals have been asked whether they carried out any activity in the last 12 months for 
which they were paid in money or in kind without reporting to tax authorities. To be specific, 
the question was “Did you yourself carry out any undeclared activities in the last 12 months 
for which you were paid in money or in kind? Herewith we mean activities which were not or 
not fully reported to tax or social security authorities and where the person who acquired the 
good or service was aware of this”.
19 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, undeclared work seems to be more common among men than 
women. 8% of men in the sample performed undeclared work in the previous year, whereas 
only 3.4% of women did so. Moreover, undeclared work is more pervasive amongst younger 
people with the level of undeclared work becoming smaller when the age category raises.  
 
Concerning the occupational status of people involving in undeclared activities, two groups 
are usually in the spotlight of government state: unemployed and self-employed. These two 
                                                 
18 See BAUMEISTER (1982, pp.3-26). 
19 Eurobarometer, question QB19   8 
groups are assumed to be largely involved in undeclared work since the first ones have time to 
do  it  and  the  second  ones  do  activities  which  make  it  easier.  As can  be  seen  in  table  1 
hereinafter, the unemployed and self-employed people are less willing to answer the question 
(regarding their own involvement in undeclared activities) but when they did so, these two 
groups are those who affirm the most to work without informing tax authorities. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive analysis of the Eurobarometer database 
   Sample 
composition  Answer (%)  UDW (Yes) 
Men  42%  96.3%  8% 
Women  58%  96.8%  3.4% 
Age 
15-24  12.6%  96.5%  9.7% 
25-39  22.9%  95.9%  7.8% 
40-54  25.6%  96.7%  5.7% 
55+  38.9%  96.9%  2.2% 
Occupation 
House persons  9.4%  96.5%  2.7% 
Students  8.3%  97.1%  9.6% 
Unemployed  5.4%  94.9%  10.5% 
Retired  28.9%  97.2%  2.0% 
Self-employed  6.3%  95.3%  9.3% 
Managers  4%  96.5%  5.3% 
Others white collar workers  24.1%  97.2%  4.9% 
Manual workers  13.7%  95.4%  8.4% 
Risk level to be caught (perception) 
Very high  6.4%  96.8%  2.6% 
High  24.7%  97.2%  3.4% 
Weak  38.6%  97.8%  6.7% 
Very weak  18.1%  97.2%  8.5% 
Don’t know   12.1%  90.4%  1.4% 
Sanction perception 
Nomal taxes  21.4%  96.9%  6.9% 
Normal taxes + fine  59.0%  97.9%  5.3% 
Jail  5.1%  97.3%  5.4% 
Don't know or refusal  14.5%  90.4%  3.1% 
Politics opinion 
Left orientation  45.6%  97.2%  5.6% 
Right orientation  30.6%  96.8%  6.2% 
Don’t know & Refusal  23.7%  95.2%  3.5% 
Country location 
Nordic  11.4%  98.9%  9.7% 
Southern  31.6%  96.6%  2.3% 
Eastern  18.9%  95.9%  5.9% 
Continental  38.2%  96.6%  4.8% 
Others 
Owner
20  75.2%  96.8%  4.9% 
Couple
21  58.3%  96.8%  4.8% 
                                                 
20 The owner variable is composed by house or apartment’s owner who has finished paying for or who are 
paying for. 
21 The couple variable is composed by married, remarried and unmarried partner.   9 
Across all the 27 countries of the European Union, more than half of the general public (55%) 
estimated that the risk of being detected when doing undeclared work was weak or very small. 
Furthermore, our descriptive analysis seems to confirm us that our hypothesis H5 is right 
since, in a first time, more people think that the probability to be detected is small,
22 more 
people report to be involved in undeclared activities. Then, the less the sanction perception is 
significant, the more the undeclared work participation is important. 
 
A  surprising  observation  concerns  the  geographic  area,  in  which  data  tend  to  show  that 
undeclared  work  in  Nordic  countries  appears  to be  most  significant than  elsewhere.  This 
observation refutes our theoretical hypothesis H6 since south European countries report less 
undeclared activities participation than the others areas. Indeed, only 2.3% of the southern 
countries interviewees affirm doing undeclared work whereas 9.7%, 5.9%, and 4.8% of the 
Nordic, Eastern, and Continental people respectively declare doing so. 
 
For  the  social  ethics  variable,  we  used  a  proxy  variable  established  with  seven  specifics 
questions  in  order  to  assess  feelings  about  various  behaviours.
23  The  interviewee  had  to 
answer the questions by using a scale of values between 1 and 10 depending on whether the 
interviewees find the behaviour “absolutely  unacceptable” (“1”) or  whether he/she find it 
“'absolutely acceptable” (“10”). Therefore, the more the variable “social ethics” is close to 70, 
the less the social ethics is strong. Conversely, if the variable “social ethics” is weak, the 









                                                 
22 This observation is based on respondents’ personal perceptions. They don’t necessarily correspond to the real 
detection risk in the respective countries. However, personal assessments of the detection risk might be more 
relevant to the decision to participate in undeclared work. 
23 Eurobarometer, question QB32(1-7): For each of their behaviour, please tell me to what extent you find it 
acceptable  or  not  :  1)  “Someone  receives  welfare  payments  without  entitlement  ;  2)  Someone  uses  public 
transport without a valid ticket ; 3) A private person is hired by a private household for work and he\ she does 
not report the payment received in return to tax or social security institutions although it should be reported ; 4) 
A firm is hired by a private household for work and it does not report the payment received in return to tax or 
social security institutions; 5) A firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not report its activity to tax or 
social security institutions ; 6) A firm hires a private person and all or a part of the salary paid to him\ her is not 
officially registered ; 7) Someone evades taxes by not or only partially declaring income”. The variable Social 
Ethics is build as the sum of the seven responses.   10 
Table 2: Descriptive analysis of the Social ethics variable  
 
   Mean  Standard 
Error 
Someone receives welfare payments without entitlement   2.25  2.49 
Someone uses public transport without a valid ticket   2.87  2.63 
A private person is hired by a private household for work and he\ she does not 
report the payment received in return to tax or social security institutions 
although it should be reported 
4.07  3.15 
A firm is hired by a private household for work and it does not report the 
payment received in return to tax or social security institutions  2.82  2.77 
A firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not report its activity to tax 
or social security institutions   2.52  2.69 
A firm hires a private person and all or a part of the salary paid to him\ her is 
not officially registered   2.72  2.75 
Someone evades taxes by not or only partially declaring income  2.88  2.72 
Social ethics
24  18.86  12.50 
 
II.3   The model: introduction and specification 
 
In the survey, some people have refused to answer to the question dealing with their own 
involvement in the undeclared work. This decision causes a selection bias. The selection bias 
comes from the self-selection of individuals to answer to this specific question. The term 
selection  bias  most  often  refers  to  the  distortion  of  a  statistical  analysis,  due  to  sample 
collection methods. If the selection bias is not taken into account then any conclusions drawn 
may be wrong. Therefore, we have tried to treat the selection effect of our database.
25 To do 




Consider a model, in which we try to identify and predict the likehood of undeclared work’s 
participation  from  some  personals  characteristics,  political  and  institutional  perception 
features. We have 26,659 observations in our database in which only 909 persons refused to 
answer  the  question  “Did  you  yourself  carry  out  any  undeclared  activities  in  the  last  12 
                                                 
24  547  observations  are  undetermined  because  some  individual  refuse  to  answer  at  least  one  of  the  seven 
questions. 
25 Selection bias is a distortion of evidence or data that arises from the way that the data are collected. It is 
sometimes referred to as the selection effect. See GREENE (1981, pp. 795-798).  
26 See HECKMAN (1979, pp.153-163).    11 
months for which you were paid in money or in kind?”.
27 We cannot make a simple-minded 
model in which we estimate the regression model using only the observations that have a 
response.  
 
This analysis could be fine if, in fact, the missing “answer” data were missing completely at 
random. However, the decision to refuse or not answering the question about undeclared work 
was made by the respondent. Therefore, those who refuse to answer at the question constitute 
a self-selected sample and not a random sample. It is likely that some interviewees who chose 
to refuse to answer to the question would have answered “yes” and this would account for 
much of the missing “answer” data. Thus, it is likely that we underestimate the positive 
statement of undeclared work participation. This is problematic if collectively the individuals 
who  don’t  answer  the  question  are  systematically  different  from  those  who  do,  and 
consequently the final sample may be biased. This is known as “sample bias”.
28  
 
A  possible  solution  to  solve  this  inconvenient  is  to  apply  the  Heckman  selection  model. 
Theoretically, this model is formulated in two equations. At first, we have to regress the 
selection for the response. This is a simple equation which explains the answer or no answer 
to the question about undeclared work:   i i i i u X R + + = β α , where R is binary variable (1 for 
response “yes or no”, 0 otherwise),
29 X is a vector including all observed factors which could 
explain  the  answer  to  the  question  (age,  sex,  sector,  education,  owner,  political  opinion, 
profession,  etc.)  and  U  is  the  error  term  which  is  assumed  to  be  normally  distributed 
) , 0 (
2
u i N u σ a in  order  to  take  into  account  non  observed  factors  which  could  affect  the 
response  decision.  A  vector  of  inverse  Mill’s  ratios  (estimated  expected  error)  can  be 
generated from the parameter estimated.  The independent variable, y, meaning “did you get 
an undeclared activity in the last 12 months” is observed only when the selection equation 
equals  1  (i.e.  when  people  have  answered  to  the  question)  and  is  then  regressed  on  the 
explanatory variables, x, and the vector of inverse Mill’s ratios from the selection equation by 
a probit specification.
30 Therefore, the second stage reruns the regression with the estimated 
expected error included as an extra explanatory variable, removing the part of the error term 
                                                 
27 See EUROBAROMETER, op. cit., question QB19: they mean in the question, activities which were not or not 
fully reported to the tax or social security authorities and where the person who acquired the good or service was 
aware of this. 
28 CUDDEBACK, WILSON, ORME and COMBS-ORME (2004, pp. 20-21). 
29 Otherwise means refuse to answer or don’t know. 
30 The Heckman selection model allow us to use information from non respondent to the undeclared work’s 
question in order to improve the estimates of the parameters in the regression model   12 
Selection model of answering the 
question 
Sample: 25.750 individuals 
Dependent variable: answer the question dealing about undeclared work 
Probit model 
YES  NO 
Step 1 
Undeclared work supply  Step 2 
Dependent variable: Did you yourself carry out any undeclared activities in the 
last 12 months for which you were paid in money or in kind? 
correlated with the explanatory variable and avoiding the bias.
31 Sample selection bias has 
been corrected by the selection equation, which determines whether an observation makes it 
into  the  non-random  sample.  The  second  regression  can  be  written  as: 
i i i u M X Y + + + = δ β α , where Yi is the binary dependent variable (making undeclared work 
or not), Xi is a vector with explanatory variables, and M is the inversed Mill’s ratio. The 
following figure describes the methodology adopted to estimate the decision to answer the 
question and to supply undeclared work in the past 12 month. 
 
Graph 1:  Schema of the econometric analysis design 
 
In practice, some statistical software such as STATA provides indicators in order to identify 
and to correct bias selection. This indicator is called ρ in the STATA software. When ρ = 0, 
the probit regression provides unbiased estimates and when ρ≠ 0, the probit estimates are 
biased. The Heckman selection model allows us to improve the estimates of the parameters in 
the  regression  model.  The  Heckman  selection  model  provides  consistent,  asymptotically 
efficient estimates for all parameters in the model.
32 
 
                                                 
31 CUDDEBACK, WILSON, ORME and COMBS-ORME (2004, pp.19-31). 
32 BAUM (2006, pp.273-275)   13 
III.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
The Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the probit regression analysis. The estimations come 
from the STATA software where we used the “heckprob”command.
33  
 
Table 3 : Probit estimation result with sample selection 
   Coef.  Std. Err.     Coef.  Std. Err. 




Dependent variable: Answer or 
not 




Dependent variable: Answer or 
not 
Household  size  0.005    (0.014)  Town (reference = small or middle size town) 
Social ethics      -0.013     (0.001)***  Rural  0.009     (0.038) 
Sex (reference 
women)     
-0.062     (0.034)*  Large town     -0.019     (0.041) 
Occupation (reference = blue collar)  Couple     -0.010     (0.038) 
House Person     0.140     (0.069)**  Age      0.000  (0.005) 
Unemployed  -0.004     (0.071)  Age^2     0.000  (0.000) 
Retired  0.260    (0.064)***  Education     -0.001       
Self employed  -0.074     (0.068)  Owner  0.054  (0.036) 
Managers  -0.013   (0.088)  Politics opinion (reference= right) 
Other white collars   0.093  (0.052)*  Politics left   0.057    (0.038) 
Students  0.150     (0.085)**  Politics refuse     0.063    (0.043) 
Risk (reference = weak)    Cooperation (reference = fair) 
Very high risk     -0.132     (0.067)**  Excellent      0.078   (0.037)** 
High risk   -0.068     (0.044)  Medium      -0.230     (0.048)*** 
Very weak risk  -0.034     (0.049)**  Bad     -0.282  (0.085)*** 
Risk, don't know    -0.311     (0.051)***  Area (reference = Continental) (1) 
Sanction (reference = normal taxes)  Nordic      0.299   (0.075)*** 
Sanction, normal 
taxes + fine        -0.095     (0.041)**  South     0.075     (0.048) 
Sanction jail       -0.102      (0.076)  Estern      0.044     (0.039) 
Sanction, don't 
know       -0.389     (0.045)***  Constant      2.12  (0.159)*** 
     
  ρ  -0.449    (0.181)***       
LR test of indep. eqns.  
  
(rho = 0):chi2(1) =3.92 (3) 
***,**,* signal a level of significance of 1%, 5%, 10% ;  
(1) The 27 countries were pooled into four analytical groups : Continental for Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, The 
Netherlands, Austria and United Kingdom; Eastern for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia and Slovakia; Southern for Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta and Portugal; Nordic for Denmark, Finland and Sweden ; 
(2) P value = 0.033;  
(3) Prob > chi2 = 0.0478 
 
When ρ ≠ 0, standard probit techniques applied to the main equation yield biased results. 
“Heckprob” provides consistent, asymptotically efficient estimated for all the parameters in 
such models. In our database, the Heckman estimation confirms that the selection bias is 
present. Indeed, the likelihood-ratio test of independent equations conclusively rejects that 
                                                 
33 Heckprob fits maximum-likehood probit models with sample selection.   14 
null hypothesis with an estimated ρ of -0.449. The two step procedure is therefore useful to 
get non biased estimation on the undeclared work participation.
34  
 
As can be seen on Table 4 hereinafter, coefficients of explanatory variables have changed, 
becoming either more accurate, either more statistically significant. The main determinants 
which  influence  the  availability  of  answering  the  question  dealing  with  people’s  own 
participation in undeclared activities are not surprising: social ethics, occupation, sanction, 
risk of being detected, survey’s cooperation and sex are statistically significant. Most of them 
act in the expected direction. Indeed, social ethics has negative coefficient, indicating that less 
people have social value (about collective choice, public goods, and etc.),
35 less they tend to 
answer the question. 
 
Retired and students are more willing to answer the question than the others occupation status. 
We could explain this result by the fact that both groups are usually less audited than the 
others professions.  
 
The risk to be caught is an interesting variable since it seem that people who thinks that the 
risk is very high or very weak tend to response less than people who thinks that this risk is 
simply weak. This result gets a 5% of statistical level of significance. Obviously, cooperation 
is an important determinant of response since all the dummies have an important statistical 
significance. The results confirm the insight since the correlation between cooperation and 
response in the specific question on their own involvement in undeclared work is positive. 
Finally,  an  interesting  result  can  be  found  in  geographic  area  variables.  In  fact,  Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) have people who seem to be straighter. Indeed, the 
estimated coefficient of Nordic countries is positive and highly statistically significant. 
 
To summarize our first analysis, we have showed that our database exhibits a selection bias 
which we have to correct for our next study. Some factors can explain why people are more 
willing to speak about their own involvement in undeclared work. The most important ones 
are  the  social  ethics,  the  occupation,  the  geographic  area,  the  risk  to  be  caught  and  the 
cooperation. But is it the most relevant factors to explain why people do undeclared work? 
                                                 
34 For more information about this econometric technique, see BAUM ( 2006, pp.272-280) 
35 See how the variable is built in section III.2. Therefore, more the variable is positive and high, less people has 
intrinsically social ethics.   15 
Table 4 presents the probit analysis with correction of selection bias. The corrected estimation 
provides better statistical results (more precisely assessed).
36 In this regression, the dependent 
variable is a binary variable which takes 1 if the interviewee stated having participated to an 
undeclared work in the last 12 months, 0 if he/she didn’t. This dependent variable is regressed 
on a series of explanatory variables. 
 
Table 4: Probit estimation result with sample selection  
With correction selection bias 
Variable  Coefficients  Variable  Coefficients 
Udw participation (supply) 
Social ethics      0.018***  Politics opinion: reference = right 
Sex (reference women)     0.351***  Politics left  0.001 
Education     -0.002  Politics refuse    -0.183***    
Owner (reference no)     -0.078**  Country : reference = Belgium 
Couple     -0.125***  Denmark      0.707*** 
Age      0.024***  Germany       -0.326***    
Age^2     -0.001***  Greece  -0.161    
Occupation : reference = manual workers  Spain     -0.183    
House Person     -0.066  Finland      0.096    
Unemployed  0.21**  France      0.166*    
Retired  -0.176***  Ireland    -0.218*    
Self employed  0.129**  Italy     -0.106    
Managers  -0.276***  Luxembourg      0.086**    
Other white collars  -0.286***  Netherlands      0.544***     
Students  -0.092  Austria  0.200** 
Risk : reference = weak  Portugal      -0.228**    
Very high risk     -0.365***  Sweden      0.478***    
High  risk  -0.292***  United Kingdom     -0.236**    
Very weak risk  0.126***  Cyprus  -0.797***    
Risk, don't know  -0.573***  Czech Republic      0.017    
Sanction: reference = contribution + fine  Estonia  0.491***    
Sanction contribution         0.160***  Hungaria     0.145    
Sanction jail        0.019  Latvia     0.494***    
Sanction refuse        -0.049  Lituania        0.075    
Ville: reference = small and mid size  Malta     -0.426**    
Rural village  0.044  Poland       0.044    
Large town     -0.013  Slovakia     0.012    
Cooperation : reference = fair  Slovénia    -0.007    
Excellent       0.025  Bulgaria     -0.002    
Medium      -0.018     Romania     -0.085    
Bad     0.222**  Constant  -2.05***    
***, **, * signal a level of significance of 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. 
 
Hypothesis 1 in the section II indicated a negative correlation between age and undeclared 
work.  Our  result  contradicts  this  hypothesis  since  our  coefficient  for  the  variable  Age  is 
                                                 
36 Some variables are becoming statistically different from zero, others are becoming non significant.   16 
positive. Nevertheless, we have to relativize our result by the fact that the coefficient is very 
small and because the coefficient of age squares is negative.
37  
 
Women were assumed to be more compliant (so less wiling to do undeclared activities) in our 
hypothesis 2. Our result confirms that scientific literature’s observation since our estimated 
coefficient is positive (0.351) and statistically significant at 1% level.  
 
Education doesn’t seem to be a relevant factor of undeclared work, which undermines the 
hypothesis 3 mentioning a negative correlation between education level and undeclared work. 
But occupation and education could be linked up. And yet, occupation is a relevant variable 
explaining  undeclared  activities.  Unemployed  and  self-employed  seem  to  take  part  in 
undeclared activities more than the other groups of workers. On the other hand, the retired, 
the managed and the other white collars workers are less involve than the manual workers 
(reference category). All these results are statistically significant.  
 
As we have said in our theoretical analysis, tax morale and social ethics are sorely related.
38 
Social ethics of people are an important determinant of the undeclared activities. We had 
presumed in our hypothesis 4 that people with greater social ethics tend to be less involved in 
undeclared work, i.e. that social ethics should be negatively correlated with undeclared work. 
This is confirmed by our results: the coefficient of the social ethics is indeed positive
39 and 
statically significant at 1% level. 
 
Deterrence effect (hypothesis 5) is a combination of risk to be detected and level of sanction. 
First, the risk to be detected seems to be a good dissuasive effect. Our results show that more 
it is perceived as high, less people report doing undeclared work. All the coefficients are 
highly statically different from zero. Then, concerning the level of sanction, our results are 
less conclusive. Only the fact that undeclared workers have to pay the amount of income tax 
                                                 
37 A positive coefficient for age and a negative coefficient for the variable age squares means that more people 
become older, more they do undeclared work and proportionally less than before (when they were younger) 
38 But in an opposition way, given that social ethics construction. Recall that the variable is build by adding up 
the interpreting result of 7 questions. More the variable “social ethics” is close to 70, less the social ethics is 
strong. Conversely, if the variable “social ethics” is weak, that means the social ethics of the individual is strong. 
See descriptive analysis section for more details. 
39 Pay attention to the construction of the variable SOCIAL ETHICS: if the individual has an important value of 
social ethics, then the  value  of his variable SOCIAL ETHICS is  weak (closer to 7 than to 70). Therefore, 
hypothesis  8  assumes  a  negative  correlation  between  social  ethics  and  undeclared  work  and  our  positive 
correlation in our results means the same as the hypothesis 4.   17 
plus a fine is deterrent: the coefficient of this variable is indeed the only to be positive and 
statically significant at 1% level. A first inconvenient of our database could be showed in the 
variable “Risk don’t know”. People who refuse to answer at the risk level question report also 
not doing undeclared work: the coefficient amount to -0.573 and is statically significant at 1% 
level, which is relatively considerable. People, who refuse to answer at the level risk question 
and state to not doing undeclared work, are probably lying upon the real undeclared practices. 
A  simple  correlation  analysis  between  those  variables  and  cooperation  shows  a  negative 
liaison, which tend to confirm our idea of lie. 
 
Some countries are known for accommodating more cheating than others. Our hypothesis 6 
assumes that countries from the south geographic area should be those countries. Curiously, 
they don’t. All the estimated coefficients (Italy, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Malta and Portugal) 
are  negative  but  no  significantly  different  from  zero  (compare  to  Belgium)  except  for 
Portugal, Cyprus and Malta. This is again a surprising result. Our underlying assumption 
hereinbefore is perhaps also in application for that result. On the contrary, Nordic countries, 
which  were  assumed  to  be  less  involved  in  undeclared  work,  have  positive  (and  highly 
significant) coefficients.
40 From an individual standpoint (and with all the precaution induced 
by  a survey), some  countries as  France,  Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, 
Denmark,  Estonia,  Latvia  tend  to  be  more  affected  by  undeclared  work  than  the  others 
members of the European Union. Contrarily, countries such as Germany, Ireland, Portugal, 
United Kingdom, Cyprus, and Malta are less concerned by undeclared work than the others 
European Union countries. 
 
Finally,  cooperation  is  assumed  to  be  negatively  correlated  to  undeclared  work  in  our 
hypothesis 7. This hypothesis seems to be confirmed by our result, in particular when the 
interviewees  cooperate  rather  badly.  The  coefficient  of  the  variable  bad  cooperation  is 
positive and statically significant at 5% level. 
 
Others variables than those debated in our hypothesis had been inserted in our model. The 
results of our regression show that homeowners and couple (married or cohabits people) are 
less willing to work without declaring their income to the tax authorities. The coefficients are 
estimated at -0.078 and -0.125 respectively and are statically significant.  
                                                 
40 Except for Finland   18 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Undeclared work is a popular academic and governmental research topic in most developed 
countries. In 2007, the European Commission decided to carry out a European Survey called 
“Eurobarometer” on this sensitive issue. The Commission interviewed almost 27 000 citizens 
coming from the 27 European Union Member States, thereby providing an important cross-
country database on the primary determinants of undeclared work in the EU. 
 
In this study, we have relied on the undeclared work and tax evasion literature, to identify 7 
testing hypothesis. Our probit regression analysis corrected of the sample selection shows that 
many, but not all, of these hypotheses are corroborated by our database. Women are less 
willing to engage into undeclared work than men. Social ethics, synonymous to tax morale in 
the literature, is a relevant factor of undeclared work. Literature takes the view that tax morale 
(or social ethics) and its determinants can best explain the phenomenon of tax compliance (or 
declared work compliance) internationally.
41 Our results indicate that the less the individuals 
adhere to moral taxation principles, the more they  declare working without paying taxes. 
Therefore, informing and educating people to the utility of their taxes should help enhance the 
social ethics of the population. Indeed, we think that the best way to improve the moral values 
of people is to well-informed them. The nexus between the risk of being detected and a high, 
costly, sanction (called deterrence effect) is also a major determinant of undeclared work.  
 
From a public policy standpoint, this implies that Governments should elevate the perception 
of the deterrent effect in order to decrease the people’s tendency to work without declaring all 
their income. To this end, governments may either increase tax control (and in so doing, the 
risk to be caught) or elevate the sanctions incurred for a violation of reporting obligations. 
Landlords and couples (married or cohabits people) are finally less willing to work without 
declaring  their  income  to  the  tax  authorities  than  people  who  are  not.  Thus,  the  tax 
administrations should primarily concentrate on single individuals and people that do not own 
their residence. All our results remain robust to different cross-country control variables. 
 
 
                                                 
41 A. RIAHI-BELKAOIU (2004, pp. 135–136). 
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